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Introduction
This book traces the emergence and transformation of a German liberal move­
ment in the Habsburg monarchy. In mid-nineteenth-century Austria men and 
women, largely of Burger social origins, forged a political movement that chal­
lenged the legitimacy of the reigning systems of government. Calling them­
selves “liberals,” they mounted a revolutionary campaign in 1848 to establish 
their own rule over Austrian society. The ensuing struggles between liberalism 
and its various opponents were political in the broadest sense of the word. They 
were as much about establishing an alternative system of values and cultural 
practices in Austrian society as they were about mastering specific political 
institutions.
The liberals fought their battles using two strategies. The first of these pro­
duced an interregional political culture meant to serve as an alternative to the 
stifling rule of bureaucratic absolutism during the Vormdrz. Organized through 
independent voluntary associations, this political culture became a means for 
building, coordinating, and controlling participation in politics by the Volk. The 
other strategy involved the deployment of a powerful public rhetoric developed 
by liberals to justify their revolution. Starting in 1848 with an explosion in print 
culture and the proliferation of voluntary associations, the values and percep­
tions associated with liberalism gradually came to dominate public discourse in 
the Habsburg monarchy. They remained a cultural force to be reckoned with 
long after the official liberal parties had declined in the 1890s.
Despite severe setbacks in the years following 1848, their strategies paid 
off in the 1860s as Austrian liberals enjoyed some success in their efforts to 
transform social and government institutions. In 1867 they imposed a consti­
tution largely of their own making on an unwilling emperor, thereby ending the 
historic dominance of local politics by the bureaucracy, the nobility, and 
the Catholic Church. They established a system of compulsory education for 
Austrian youth, substantially reducing the influence of the church over curricu­
lum and instruction. Already in the 1870s it was apparent that these victories 
had brought enormous changes to Austrian social and political life. Liberal po­
litical parties came to dominate local and state institutions in many parts of the
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monarchy, while their economic and social reform projects often transformed 
sleepy provincial landscapes into booming centers of industrial production.
At the same time, liberal cultural values gradually gained broad accept­
ance in urban Austrian society. Most of these—ideas about market compe­
tition, individual self-improvement, personal respectability, and a confident 
rationalism—rested on the fundamental belief that the economically inde­
pendent individual was the productive cornerstone of public life. It was this 
individual’s financial and intellectual independence that gained for him the 
rights of active citizenship. The logic behind this concept of active public citi­
zenship implied the existence of a complementary realm as well, however, one 
inhabited by passive, dependent individuals who lacked the vision that sup­
posedly derived from intellectual maturity and financial independence. De­
spite the equal status assigned to all people by a liberal rhetoric of universal 
citizenship, active citizens maintained implicitly hierarchic relationships with 
the women and children, as well as racial and class inferiors. The presumed 
inability of the latter to use reason consigned them to passive rights of citizen­
ship. The ideological and juridical distance separating the denizens of these two 
spheres was simultaneously profound and insignificant, according to the liberal 
worldview. It was profound because passive citizens could never, as such, 
enjoy active rights of participation. Yet this gulf was also insignificant since 
basic human nature gave at least some of these passive citizens the tools for 
eventually earning the rights of active citizenship.
Starting with revolutionary events in 1848, liberal rhetoric about society 
reconciled any apparent contradiction between fundamental human equality 
and the political necessity of retaining distinctions between active and passive 
forms of citizenship. The success of this rhetoric reflected the liberals’ ability 
to connect the social practices with the beliefs of a politically frustrated urban 
Burgertum inside their new political organizational structures. Common prac­
tice in local voluntary associations shaped the new liberal rhetoric, thereby 
ensuring the increasing popularity of such rhetoric throughout much of the so­
cially and regionally diverse Habsburg monarchy. The combination of liberal 
ideology with an emerging liberal political culture provided both rhetorical 
and real spaces for the mediation of liberalism’s two powerful yet often con­
tradictory urges in nineteenth-century Austria: between egalitarian demands 
for individual empowerment and the property owner’s desire to prevent poten­
tially dangerous social change.
Another enduring legacy of liberal discourse about society, one that 
continues to dominate the political cultures of Central Europe today, was the 
creation of a nationalist identity politics among German bourgeois activists.'
1. I do not wish to imply here that German nationalism developed outside the context of 
other earlier and aggressive forms of nationalism like that of the Czechs. Nevertheless, I want to
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Since its appearance, scholars have framed German nationalism m nineteenth- 
century Austria, particularly its more radical varieties, as fundamentally op­
posed to liberal principles and practices. Contemporary observers and later 
historians alike attributed the very decline of political liberalism m the 1880s 
to the simultaneous political mobilization brought about by Gemian nation­
alist activism. This book challenges that view, arguing that liberal rhetonc and 
organizational practice actually determined the shape and content of national­
ist mass politics well into the twentieth century. The liberals themselves created 
a powerful new politics organized around nationalist identity in order to re­
pulse the growing threats to their local hegemony, threats that were increas­
ingly couched in nation-based (the Czechs), class-based (socialism), or race- 
based (anti-Semitism) discourse. Liberal rhetoric about society provided a 
crucial ideological foundation for the later explosion of German nationalist 
politics at the end of the nineteenth century, as activists transformed their ideas 
about the social differences that separated the spheres of active and passive 
citizenship into beliefs about national differences. The liberal 
spheres of active and passive citizenship itself was transformed by 1900 into a 
discourse about cultural and, later, often racial difference. Even the Geimart 
radical and anti-Semitic groups that challenged liberal hegemony m the 1880s 
and 1890s simply promised to carry out liberal nationalist commitments more
cffcctivclv.Historians have generally ignored these proofs of liberalism s underly­
ing vitality to focus more narrowly on the Liberal Party’s apparent inability to 
survive in an age of mass-based suffrage and political mobilization. Dwelling 
on Austrian liberalism’s brief parliamentary history, they have treated lib­
eralism largely as an unchanging ideological phenomenon with few natural 
constituents beyond an elitist upper bourgeoisie. Certainly the liberal parties 
faltered at the parliamentary level after 1880, and the uncritical acceptance of 
several traditional liberal values declined. A decade of harsh economic depres­
sion and the growing perceptions of a corrupt opportunism within the liberal 
parties weakened popular belief in liberalism’s utopian promises and suggested 
that liberal rhetoric did not always match liberal actions. By 1900, the once 
powerful liberal movement seemed curiously spent as a political force m Aus­
tria The liberal parties, once the largest bloc in parliament, all but disappe^ed 
to be replaced by regional and nationalist interest groups. Unlike other liber^ 
parties in Europe that managed to maintain some parliamentary presence well 
into the twentieth century, the Austrian liberals seem to have been completely 
eclipsed by the rise of mass socialist. Catholic, and nationalist populist parties 
on the left and right of the political spectrum.
stress the ways in which liberal and radical forms of German nationalism derived both their orga­
nizational style and their ideological content from liberalism and its traditions.
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This parliamentary decline, however, represents only a small part of the 
story and one that was played out primarily in the imperial metropole Vienna.^ 
If one approaches liberalism from the perspective of the regional political 
cultures it created, the narrative looks very different. Liberal political culture 
seems to have reinvented itself frequently, adapting its influential social 
rhetoric and organizational practices to dramatically changing circumstances 
as it tried to maintain its power to order local society. From this viewpoint, 
the central drama of Austrian liberalism becomes the challenge to alter its prac­
tices in order to maintain its social hegemony, not its parliamentary defeat 
at the hands of the populist parties. Outside Vienna it was the liberals, not their 
populist opponents, who politicized ethnic and gender differences most suc­
cessfully in the 1880s by forging a new mass politics organized around na­
tionalism. In Austria, German nationalism came to serve a political function 
closely resembling that of early liberalism, namely to consolidate Burger hege­
mony in local politics by demanding social unity at all costs. Nationalism 
helped to mediate an attempted trasformismo from traditionally elite liberal 
politics to a controlled form of mass politics under the watchful eye of Biitger 
elites. By the late nineteenth century, German nationalism often augmented lib­
eralism as a worldview that promoted social harmony and the protection of 
property among a Biirgertum whose social parameters were increasingly more 
broadly defined.
Starting in the 1880s the few historians who wrote about Austrian lib­
eralism approached it from the vantage point of its spectacular parliamen­
tary decline. Reacting with bitterness to their loss of parliamentary power, 
nineteenth-century liberal observers criticized the apparent short-sightedness 
of their leaders, citing factionalism as the major reason for the movement’s 
downfall. These accounts dwelt on the excessive personal pride and greed dis­
played by party leaders, as well as their noticeable want of political acumen.^
2, This is one problem, for example, with John Boyer’s observations about liberalism in 
Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 
JS4S-JS97 (Chicago, 1981).
3. Harry Ritter, “Austro-German Liberalism and the Modem Liberal Tradition,” German 
Studies Review 1 (1984): 227-47. Ritter points out that “the terms and metaphors which control 
present-day discourse about nineteenth-century [Austrian] liberalism are, to a great extent, taken 
over directly from the figurative language of pathology invented in some cases ... by insecure or 
disillusioned turn-of-the-century liberals themselves.” Journalist historians who wrote from this 
point of view include Heinrich Friedjung, Heinrich Poliak, Ferdinand von Krones, and Richard 
Charmatz. Charmatz’s Deutsch-Osterreichische PoUtik: Studien iiber den Liberalismus und iiber 
die Auswdrtige Politik Osterreichs (Leipzig, 1907) is one of the best of the early surveys. In the 
1950s, Georg Franz published an exhaustive work on liberalism in the 1860s, Liberalismus. Die 
deutschliberale Bewegung in der habsburgischen Monarchie (Munich, 1955). Although sympa­
thetic in tone, the book combines the tragic self-diagnosis of turn-of-the-century liberal authors 
with a more nationalist and occasionally anti-Semitic viewpoint. Karl Eder’s Der Liberalismus in
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Other historians with liberal sympathies blamed the movement’s decline on 
the rapid rise of political nationalism at the end of the century. These observers 
believed that the rise of nationalism in the ethnically diverse monarchy even­
tually robbed political liberalism of its core urban constituencies. In both the 
First and Second Republics, the handful of nationalist voters who refused to 
support either the socialist or Catholic parties are still viewed as the missing 
constituents of liberalism.'*
After the Second World War and particularly in the 1960s, Austrian liber­
alism fell victim to another powerful historical interpretation, the Sonderweg, 
or “exceptional route,” theory of German development.^ Although this inter­
pretation has been adequately criticized on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds by several historians of Germany, it is worth briefly pointing out how 
it has come to influence Austrian historiography. In the 1960s, several histori­
ans of Germany began looking explicitly to nineteenth-century political culture 
for keys to understanding the rise of authoritarianism in the 1930s. The “ex­
ceptional route” model explained twentieth-century fascism by charting the 
ways in which so-called preindustrial social and cultural patterns of behavior in 
the spheres of society and politics survived well into the “modem” era. An un­
usually weak bourgeoisie, unable to promote its own “modem” ways of doing 
business against the force of traditional elites, supposedly adapted itself to the 
mling, “semifeudal” stractures of public life.® Historians who promoted this 
view based it on several kinds of decontextualized sociological evidence, such 
as, for example, the authoritarian behavior of German industrial employers
Altosterreich: Geisteshaltung, Politik, und Kultur (Munich: 1955) takes an unsympathetic, Catholic 
political approach.
4. This interpretation accorded well with a larger theory of political continuity that has 
served, since the 1950s, as the privileged explanation for past and present conflict in Austrian po­
litical life. That theory views the Austrian electorate as historically divided into three, generally 
unchanging voting blocs: Catholic, socialist and liberal/nationalist. Adam Wandruszka, “Oster- 
reichs politische Struktur; die Entwicklung der Parteien und politischen Bewegungen,” Geschichte 
der Republik Osterreich, ed. Heinrich Benedikt (Vienna, 1954), 291-485. It is important to note 
that while this theory appears to describe political behavior in the first and second Austrian Re­
publics adequately, it completely ignores the political behavior of German speakers in other parts of 
the monarchy such as Bohemia and Moravia, which had been important centers of Liberal Party 
strength.
5. David Blackboum and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History (Oxford, 1984); 
Eley, “What Produces Fascism: Pre-Industrial Traditions or a Crisis of the Capitalist State?” in his 
From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past (Boston, 1986), 254-82; Richard J. 
Evans, Rethinking German History: Nineteenth-Century Germany and the Origins of the Third 
Reich (London, 1987), 23-92; Robert G. Moeller, “The Kaiserreich Recast?” Journal of Social 
History, 1984, 655-83.
6. The most influential work to develop this approach is Ralf Dahrendorf’s Society and 
Democracy in Germany (London, 1968). See also Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dicta­
torship and Democracy (London, 1967).
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toward their workers, which they attributed to the survival of feudal traditions. 
In this example as with so many others, historians overlooked the possibility 
that such workplace behaviors may have had quite modem origins and may 
have suited the particular needs of German capital, particularly given the 
strength of organized labor in Germany.’
Sonderweg historians also held up the achievement of fully democratic 
parliamentary political institutions as a critical standard by which the success or 
failure of nineteenth-century liberal movements ought to be measured. This 
anachronistic reading misrepresented the political philosophy and social goals 
of nineteenth-century liberals and misunderstood the critical distinction be­
tween public civic equality and private hierarchy that underlay liberal be­
liefs about political democratization. Few liberals, whether British, French, 
German, or Austrian, felt comfortable enough with the idea of political democ­
racy to support the immediate extension of unrestricted suffrage to the working 
classes. Liberals could not even agree on extending the suffrage to middle-class 
women. And as several historians have repeatedly pointed out, Britain, that 
paragon of liberal development, introduced universal manhood suffrage long 
after Germany had done so.®
Comparative analysis in the last decade has at least relativized the more 
ahistorical claims of the Sonderweg approach. Yet troublesome questions re­
main regarding the assumed links between twentieth-century authoritarianism 
and earlier forms of social organization. Those links may be well worth pursu­
ing precisely because they indicate phenomena too complex to be explained 
away simply in terms of the survival of traditional elites. If elements of Austrian 
corporatism or fascism developed from nineteenth-century antecedents, those 
antecedents may reflect modem responses to nineteenth-century conditions and 
not the remnants of feudal culture. Blind to this possibility, however, most Son­
derweg historians attributed fascism’s appeal to the survival in Central Europe 
of traditional authoritarian social elites who had supposedly vanquished a weak 
nascent liberalism in the nineteenth century. Often taking fascism at its own 
word, they stressed its conservative ideological critique of liberal, individualist 
capitalism while playing down its strong anti-trade unionist policies and its ob­
session with the protection of individual property rights and bourgeois family 
norms. The label totalitarianism, popularized during the 1950s, aided this fic­
tion by lumping German fascism together with Soviet communism in a general 
category clearly opposed to the more advanced liberal individualism upheld by
7. For an elaboration of this point, see, for example, Dick Geary, “The Industrial Bour­
geoisie and Labour Relations in Germany 1871-1933,” in The German Bourgeoisie: Essays on the 
Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Cen­
tury, ed. David Blackbourn and Richard Evans (London and New York, 1991).
8. Geoff Eley, “Liberalism, Europe, and the Bourgeoisie 1860-1914,” in The German 
Bourgeoisie, ed. Blackbourn and Evans, 296-7, 299-300.
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the United States and Western Europe. Both fascism and coinmunism, it was 
claimed, developed in backward societies with politically weak middle classes
and surviving traditions of authoritarian rule.’ . , ... c
Most historians located liberalism’s specific failure in its inabi ity to forge 
democratic change from the revolutions that f ‘
1848_49. This was the critical moment at which, in the words of A. . ^ . y ’ 
history reached its turning point and then, in Germany and Austna, failed to 
turn ’^0 The liberals ought to have destroyed the power of the traditional elites 
(or at least badly damaged it), as had their British and French counterparts. 
Instead the story goes, their failure to impose more democratic political insti 
tutions on the Austrian monarchy proved that they lacked the robust dynamisrn 
of their British or French counterparts. This apparent failure and thc resilie^ 
of the dynasty, aristocracy and army held serious consequences for Austria s 
later developLnt. Small wonder that Austrian liberalism, beset by nationahs 
and class conflict and with little apparent popular support, failed m the ta
historians (if not history) set for it." Kocr, ^
The picture of a backward and doomed Habsburg monarchy has been re­
inforced by a teleological view of national conflict in Austna-Hungary. In its 
flnal years, nationalist strife appears to have overwhelmed the empire and 
posed a serious obstacle to the kind of reasoned political discourse favored by 
fiberal middle-class groups. The sheer inevitability of ethnic 
argued, made the question of liberal options or achievements largely irrelevant 
Noting the power of this line of thought, one historian has recently observed 
that “Ideas of what was possible for nineteenth-century Austnan liberalism 
colored by conventional ideas about what was possible for the old empire. If 
we believe the empire was ‘destined’ to collapse, this is likely to affect our ap­
proach to liberalism and its nnA!l«ilv
The fact that so many national groups seem to have coexisted unea y 
in a single state makes the monarchy appear qualitatively different from its 
neighbors to the north and west. Nationalist conflict, it is imagined, had to ex-
=nrvpv of this literature with special emphasis on economic arguments.survey of th.i™^ ^
History since 1815 (London, 1945), 68; Blackboum and Eley, The Peculiarities of German History,
11 The pervasive influence of Carl Schorske’s brilliant Fin de siecle Vienna: PoMc^ 
Culture (New yL, 1980), which relies on several of these assumptions about Austrian liberalism,
testifies to their continuing ability to persuade. . , j ki,. ,-fforts of several histo-
12 Ritter “Austro-German Liberalism,” 232. Despite the laudable efforts of several histo
rians to challeng; this approach, it remains powerful, partially due to the contemporary importance
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plode because this state was not a trae nation state organized around a single 
national group. Yet if anything, recent scholarship has taught us to view the 
traditional nationalist claims of France, Germany, or Italy with some skepti­
cism and to ask how nineteenth-century state policy actually created national 
citizens out of radically diverse local populations. Is it not finally time to see 
the Habsburg monarchy in the same terms as those other states?
In the last fifteen years, new historical work on state, economy, and soci­
ety in Austria and Germany has helped substantially to modify these rather 
extreme views. Studies of regional economies and markets have revealed the 
underlying strength of capitalist transformation and industrial development 
in many parts of the monarchy, placing regions like Bohemia and Lower Aus­
tria within the context of Western European trends. Comparative analyses have 
also demonstrated the rather obvious point that capitalist economic systems do 
not necessarily require a British or American political model in order to flour­
ish. Ironically, some historians now suggest that the survival of traditional 
elites was stronger in Britain than usually admitted, while in Central Europe a 
thriving bourgeois class exercised a variety of powers in unexpected ways. 
Scholarship on Austria has especially benefited from new approaches to the 
study of social groups loosely defined as Burger and their often hidden but 
nonetheless effective means of defining their interests and exerting influence. 
Regional social histories have revealed the complex associational networks 
that structured middle-class social life in the nineteenth century. Traditionally 
viewed as a source of social division in Central Europe, the voluntary associ­
ation actually helped middle-class Austrians to formulate and disseminate 
common social and cultural norms. The associations constituted a middle-class 
public sphere where interregional issues could be recast in terms of local iden­
tities and struggles.
Austrian scholars themselves have recently initiated a series of ambi­
tious international projects designed to study the social origins and developing 
cultures of various Burger and Mittelstand groups in all parts of the former 
monarchy. Yet relatively little of this excellent new work has yielded a dis­
cussion of Burger political culture. Instead, most historians of this highly 
variegated Burgertum focus on regional class formation without class poli­
tics. The student of the period is left with carefully nuanced insights into an 
emerging bourgeois world, insights that coexist uncomfortably with more rudi-
of ethnic identity in Central and Eastern European politics. Some of the more thoughtful revision­
ist work on the issue of nationalism in the monarchy includes Gary B. Cohen, The Politics of 
Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861-1914 (Princeton, 1981); Istvan Deak, Beyond Nation­
alism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps 1848-1918 (New York and 
Oxford, 1990); Katherine Verdery, Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centuries of Political, Eco­
nomic and Ethnic Change (Berkeley, 1983).
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mentary knowledge of that world’s various means of political expression.'^ It 
is not as if good models were not available for the kind of work that would 
connect class formation to class politics. Fifteen years ago, groundbreaking 
books by American scholars Gary B. Cohen and John W. Boyer had already 
presented superb local studies of Burger political culture in Prague and Vienna.
My own approach challenges several common interpretations of lib­
eralism in Central Europe, particularly the importance it assigns to the culture 
of the voluntary association. This focus should redress the exaggerated orienta­
tion of the literature toward the atypical experience of liberals in Vienna and 
develop a more nuanced view of liberalism’s relation to German political na­
tionalism in the late nineteenth century. A standard explanation for the apparent 
political failure of Austrian liberalism is that it lacked indigenous roots and 
was established by a socially isolated group of intellectuals and ideologues 
who imported it from France and Britain.''* Austrian liberals were never such 
dry theorists whose ideas had no practical application to Austrian conditions. 
On the contrary, and this is perhaps the most important point, their liberalism 
expressed the powerful yearnings of Austrian BUrger for institutional legitima­
tion of their contributions to society, for control over their local polity, and for 
the security necessary to pursue their economic goals. An examination of the 
political culture that emerged from associational life demonstrates the ways in 
which the liberals’ worldview originated largely in their particular organiza­
tional experience.
This book’s focus on political culture also helps to address larger ques­
tions about the extent of the collective social and political power exercised 
by the Biirgertum in the nineteenth-century Habsburg monarchy. The urban 
middle-class battle to legitimate and institutionalize its hitherto informal influ­
ence in local social relations constituted the most successful element of an 
ongoing bourgeois revolution in Austrian society in the 1860s and 1870s. Lib­
erals of all varieties, from conservative to radical, may have suffered political 
defeat in 1848, but their particular notions of public virtue, their myths of com­
munity, their visions of economic development gradually came to dominate 
Austrian public life, even in the darkest years of the post-1848 reaction. Histo­
rians of Austrian liberalism have typically pointed to the success or failure of 
specific political reforms as a standard by which to evaluate this revolution. 
Rather than view the bourgeois revolution in such narrow terms, however, I
13. Ernst Bruckmuller, Ulrike Docker, Hannes Stekl, Peter Urbanitsch, eds., Biirgertum in 
der Habsburgermonarchie (Vienna, 1990); Hannes Stekl, Peter Urbanitsch, Ernst Bruckmuller, 
Hans Heiss, eds., “Durch Arbeit, Besitz, Wissen und Gerechtigkeit. ’’ Biirgertum in der Habsburg­
ermonarchie II (yienia, 1992).
14. Franz, Liberalismus. Throughout his book, Franz treats liberalism’s emphasis on indi­
vidualism as a Western import alien to Central European thought and conditions.
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believe it makes far more sense to approach nineteenth-century European so­
cieties in terms of ongoing contested relations of political and social power 
fought at several different levels.*^ In Austria as elsewhere in Europe, few of the 
struggles that pitted the middle classes against the crown, nobility, military, and 
bureaucracy were limited to the arena of formal politics, and very few of these 
struggles resulted in absolute victory or defeat for any one group. Nevertheless, 
if the particular strengths or weaknesses of the Austro-German Biirgertum must 
be understood in a context of unresolved struggles for mastery in nineteenth- 
century Austrian society, it was a liberal discourse about society that per­
sistently set the terms for these contests.
15. David Blackbourn, “The Discrete Charm of the German Bourgeoisie,” in his Populists 
and Patricians: Essays in Modern German History (London, 1987), 73. For an extreme and prob­
lematic statement of bourgeois weakness throughout Europe, which nevertheless helps to correct 
ideas about Central European exceptionalism, see Arno Mayer’s provocative The Persistence of 
the Old Regime. Europe to the Great War (New York, 1981). David Blackbourn has noted with 
regard to the German example, “one should be wary of assuming that the bourgeoisie simply suc­
cumbed to the aristocratic embrace. What matters is the terms on which this symbiosis of old and 
new took place. This is not easy to determine. But at least we should not confuse the form with the 
substance: much of its behavior illustrated the buoyancy as much as the capitulation of the 
German bourgeoisie.”
